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ABSTRACT Employing heavy conventional encryption algorithms in communications suffers from added
overhead and processing time delay; and in wireless communications, in particular, suffers from severe
performance deterioration (avalanche effect) due to fading. Consequently, a tremendous reduction in data
throughput and increase in complexity and time delay may occur especially when information traverse
resource-limited devices as in Internet-of-Things (IoT) applications. To overcome these drawbacks, efficient
lightweight encryption algorithms have been recently proposed in literature. One of those, that is of particular
interest, requires using conventional encryption only for the first block of data in a given frame being
transmitted. All the information in the remaining blocks is transmitted securely without the need for using
heavy conventional encryption. Unlike the conventional encryption algorithms, this particular algorithm
achieves lower overhead/complexity and higher data throughput. Assuming the additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) channel, the performance of the lightweight encryption algorithm under study had been
evaluated in literature in terms of throughput under the assumption that the first block, that undergoes
conventional encryption, is free of error, which is practically unfeasible. In this paper, we consider the
AWGN channel with Rayleigh fading and assume that the signal experiences a certain channel bit error
probability and investigate the performance of the lightweight encryption algorithm under study in terms
of bit error probability and throughput. We derive analytical expressions for these performance metrics
considering modulated signals with and without coding. In addition, we propose an extension to the
lightweight encryption algorithm under study by further enhancing its security level without significantly
affecting the overhead size and processing time. Via numerical results we show the superiority of the
lightweight encryption algorithm under study over the conventional encryption algorithms (like the AES) and
the lightweight encryption algorithms proposed in literature in terms of error and throughput performance.
INDEX TERMS Lightweight encryption, security, wireless fading channels, AWGN channel, error performance, throughput, error correction coding.

I. INTRODUCTION

Tth wireless communication link in general is insecure and
open to intruders. Hence, it is vulnerable to various types of
attacks where an eavesdropper can easily intercept a comThe associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Congduan Li
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munication signal, alter it, and forward it to the destination
or resend it back to the source. Consequently, none of the
confidentiality, integrity, or authenticity of the message is
preserved while traversing the wireless medium. It is undisputable that the last two decades have witnessed a tremendous
increase in number of wireless applications offered over the
Internet and in the development of standards for wireless
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packet service; among those are the recently developed technologies such as 5G, Internet-of-Things (IoT), and cloud
computing applications just to name a few. Given these large
technologies advancements, demand for wireless content has
been extremely increasing, and hence, wireless network security based on encryption has become crucial to satisfy endto-end confidential communications. However, conventional
encryption algorithms had been designed based on the fact
that security against an adversary attack is the only main criterion with the objective that the encrypted data (i.e., the cipher)
is made to satisfy several properties including the avalanche
effect [1], [2], and [3].
The avalanche criterion is a desirable property of any
encryption algorithm from the security point of view.
It requires that a single bit change to the plaintext or the
key must result in significant and random-looking changes
to the ciphertext and vice versa; and hence a highly secured
algorithm is obtained. In general, if an intruder complements
a single bit at the input to the decryption device then an
average of one half of the decrypted bits should change,
which produces a highly secured and reliable data transmission assuming that the communication link is characterized with perfect channel conditions. Particularly, in a
communication system with perfect channel conditions the
encrypted data is received at the destination with no error,
and hence it can be perfectly decrypted at the receiver to
recover the exact plaintext that was encrypted at the transmitter. This property does in fact significantly reduce the
keyspace search by the cryptanalyst in order to guarantee that
there will not be any noticeable resemblance between two
ciphertexts obtained by applying two neighboring keys for
encrypting the same plaintext. On the other hand, these same
conventional encryption algorithms do not take into account
wireless network characteristics such as random bit errors due
to noise or interference and burst errors due to fading. Due
to these random bit errors, the avalanche effect that makes
a block cipher secure also causes it to be sensitive to bit
errors.
In [3] and [4], the authors showed that secret-key encryption systems multiply bit errors by more than an order of
magnitude. As a result, systems that use conventional encryption algorithms degrade quality of service (QoS) in exchange
for end-to-end data confidentiality. Given the large amount
of increase in wireless technologies deployment, the vast
majority of the communication contents traverses a wireless
link between a source and destination, and hence, the need
for developing new encryption algorithms that surmount the
effect of the avalanche criterion is becoming vital. This problem has received a great deal of attention in recent years and
motivated researchers in analyzing current standard encryption algorithms in terms of bit error rate, throughput, complexity, and energy efficiency in a wireless communication
environment and proposing new encryption algorithms that
alleviate the avalanche effect (see e.g., [3]–[13]). The author
in [3] quantitatively analyzed and characterized the trade-off
between QoS and confidentiality and proposed solutions to
13430

mitigate this trade-off. Another trade-off between security
and throughput in encryption-based wireless systems was
studied in [5]. The authors in [5] also proposed a technique they called opportunistic encryption that uses channel
opportunities, based on acceptable signal to noise ratio as a
performance measure, to maximize the throughput subject to
desired security constraints. Simulation results showed some
improvement in the performance as compared to conventional approaches. In [6], [8], [12], [13], the authors proposed
new encryption algorithms with improved error performance,
reduced computational complexity, and improved throughput
in a wireless fading environment. In [11], the authors developed an optimization framework for trading-off between
security and throughput in a wireless environment based
on the improved error performance algorithms reported
in [6], [13]. Computational complexity and energy efficiency
analyses for a class of symmetric crypto-systems are reported
in [7], [9], [10].
From research findings in literature, it is becoming unarguable that conventional encryption requires extra large
amount of bandwidth in wireless environment because of
the added packet overhead and the performance deterioration due to fades in wireless channels (avalanche effect);
hence tremendously reducing the effective bandwidth utilization in the wireless spectrum that is already crowded.
This is in addition to the delay caused by the processing
time required by the encryption/decryption algorithms at
the source/destination, respectively. Although, conventional
cryptography of the plaintext achieves security and privacy,
all these drawbacks add to large reduction in the effective
transmission data rate (throughput) in a wireless environment.
Moreover, performance deterioration due to fades in wireless
channels may in some extreme conditions make it almost
impossible to decrypt the data at the destination without
powerful error-correction coding techniques, which in fact
will add more processing delay.
IoT-enabled devices are among the communication entities that are not equipped with processors that can handle algorithms that require highly complex computations
and large time delays. IoT devices used in applications
such as smart homes, smart buildings, smart cities, smart
healthcare, smart grid, transportation, vehicle-to-everything
(V2X) communication, etc., are mainly wireless sensors that
communicate with servers. Protecting information captured
by these sensors is a crucial factor because the transmission channel from the sensor to the database server could
be vulnerable to attacks especially in a wireless environment. However, conventional standard encryption algorithms,
such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), cannot be used in IoT applications due to their drawbacks
(as mentioned earlier) that do not fit the limited memory
space and computational capabilities of IoT devices [14].
To encounter these challenges, lightweight encryption methods have been proposed in literature to be implemented
on these resource-constrained devices [15]–[25]. In [15],
a lightweight cellular automata-based encryption algorithm
VOLUME 8, 2020
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has been proposed for IoT applications, where sensors’ data
is encrypted at the perception layer and decrypted at the
gateway’s network layer. As compared to classical encryption algorithms like the data encryption standard (DES),
the proposed algorithm in [15] has shown higher efficiency
in terms of running time and implementation complexity.
In [16], a modification to the lightweight key-policy attributebased encryption (KP-ABE) model has been proposed to
improve its security level and efficiency such that it would be
more suitable for IoT applications. Reported results in [16]
have shown that the enhanced KP-ABE model remarkably
offers low running time as compared to other similar encryption algorithms. In [17], an enhanced version of the AES
encryption algorithm in terms of running time and energy
consumption has been presented. Obtained results in [17]
have confirmed it is fair to claim that enhanced algorithm is lightweight and efficient for voice applications in
wireless systems. In [18], a hybrid lightweight encryption
algorithm for IoT networks has been proposed. The hybrid
algorithm employs both the symmetric and asymmetric
encryption methods in a way that results in low execution time
in comparison with the AES. In [19], a lightweight encryption
algorithm for surveillance videos has been proposed. The
proposed algorithm is cellular automata based and requires
encrypting the privacy-sensitive regions instead of encrypting the entire video stream. In comparison with classical
encryption algorithms, the proposed algorithm has proven its
effectiveness especially for real time applications. For other
promising IoT applications such as smart buildings, smart
grid infrastructure, and wireless body area networks, efficient lightweight encryption algorithms have been proposed
in [20], [22], and [24], respectively.
Among the relevant works in literature, the analysis
in [25] is of particular interest as it requires using conventional encryption only for the first block of data in a given
frame (or superframe) being transmitted. The size of this data
block is determined by the conventional encryption algorithm
to be applied on this first block. All the remaining information
in the frame is transmitted securely over the wireless channel
without the need for using heavy conventional encryption.
Unlike the conventional and opportunistic encryption algorithms, the proposed algorithm in [25] has been shown to
achieve lower overhead/complexity and higher data transmission rates. The security of the introduced scheme in [25]
may not be as good as the conventional techniques. However,
the scheme can still be useful in applications when it is preferable to attain high throughput with moderate security such
IoT-enabled devices as explained above. Nevertheless, two
issues in the work of [25] has to be addressed. First, assuming
the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel model,
the performance of the lightweight encryption algorithm
in [25] has been evaluated in terms of throughput under the
assumption that the first block, that undergoes conventional
encryption, is free of error, which is practically unfeasible.
Second, the security level of the lightweight encryption model
could be further enhanced.
VOLUME 8, 2020

Thus, the contribution of this work is two-fold. First,
we analytically examine the performance of the lightweight
encryption model under study considering the AWGN channel with Rayleigh fading and assume that all data in the
frame, including the first block, experience some error with
certain probability and investigate its performance in terms
of bit error probability as well as throughput. Specifically,
we derive novel analytical expressions for these performance
metrics considering both cases of with and without data channel encoding. Second, we propose to enhance the security
level of the lightweight encryption algorithm in [25]. Specifically, we propose to add a new security process box to be
implemented at the transmitting side and to reverse it at the
receiving side. The impressive side of such improvement is
that (i) it does not come at the cost of adding significant overhead size or processing delay (i.e., the improved algorithm
is still lightweight as compared to classical encryption algorithms such as AES); (ii) it offers the same improved error rate
and throughput performance as, yet more secure than, that of
the original lightweight algorithm in [25]. Provided numerical results under different channel and coding scenarios show
that the algorithm under study offers enhanced performance
as compared to the conventional encryption algorithm AES
and the lightweight encryption algorithms proposed in literature (like the one in [26]).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II presents a review of the algorithm structure of
the lightweight encryption model proposed in [25]. Performance analyses of this lightweight encryption model,
in terms of probability of bit error and throughput, are given
in Section III and Section IV, respectively. The proposed
security enhancement on the lightweight encryption model
under study is given in Section V. Numerical results are
presented in Section VI. Finally, some conclusions are drawn
in Section VII.
II. REVIEW OF LIGHTWEIGHT ENCRYPTION MODEL
PROPOSED IN [25]
A. TRANSMITTER AND RECEIVER STRUCTURES

A conceptual structure for the transceiver system that
employs the light encryption algorithm reported in [25]
is shown in Fig. 1. The transmitter structure is depicted
in Fig. 1.a, where the incoming serial data stream (S in bits)
is mapped into parallel data blocks, each with a common
pre-specified block length (βl ).1 The first block undergoes
a proper encryption alogorithm satisfying a certain security
level. All the remaining blocks are arranged systematically
and enter a bit-wise XOR operation with the first block
(before encryption, i.e., plaintext), as can be seen from the
figure. The delay buffers are used just to control the data
flow into the P/S convertor so the serial data are produced
systematically. Next, the data is mapped back into a serial
format to be encoded before transmission (both source and
1 The algorithm requires that the block size β be determined by the
l
encryption algorithm that will be applied only to the first block.
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FIGURE 1. Transmitter and receiver structures.

channel encoding) to enhance transmission reliability. The
data stream is then modulated using any digital modulation
technique in order to be suitable for transmission. Without
loss of generality, in this paper we consider the binary phase
shift keying (BPSK) modulation scheme and the analysis can
be generalized to any other higher-order modulation. The
receiver structure, as can be seen in Fig. 1.b, completely
reverses all the operations performed at the transmitter. Also,
at the receiver side, only the first block is needed to be
decrypted using an appropriate conventional decryption algorithm and the decryption key, whereas all the other blocks
are bit-wise XORed with the first decrypted block (plaintext). As a result, all the data frame is transmitted securely
by only performing encryption on the first amount of data
(B1 in Fig. 1) within a frame/superframe while transmitting
the remaining blocks after XORing each with the hidden
plaintext block B1 . It should be obvious to the reader that the
operations performed by the bank of XOR gates along with
13432

the S/P and P/S blocks, in Fig. 1, can be practically implemented by a shift-register, one XOR gate, and a switch. The
structure shown in the figure is used to just simplify the
understanding of the concept.
B. THE ALGORITHM

Before we outline the lightweight encryption algorithm proposed in [25], we first define the data structure to be used
in the algorithm. Data sequence is assumed to be composed
of N superframes. Each superframe contains NF frames, and
each frame consists of Nb blocks, each of K = βl bits
size, as can be seen in Fig. 2. The transmission algorithm is
detailed in the text structure in Algorithm 1. The notations
used in Algorithm 1 are defined as follows: Bj : the jth block
of data (plaintext); B̃j : the jth block of the encrypted data
(ciphertext); βl : block length in bits; NF : number of
frames within a superframe; Nb : number of blocks within
a frame; bi,j : the ith bit of the jth block of the data (plaintext);
VOLUME 8, 2020
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FIGURE 2. Superframe structure.

and b̃i,j : the ith bit of the jth block of the encrypted data
(ciphertext). As it is clear from the steps in Algorithm 1,
we first encrypt the first block, B1 , with a highly immune
standard conventional encryption algorithm, where in this
work we adopt the AES.2 Following this step, the remaining
of the Nb NF − 1 plaintext blocks will not undergo conventional encryption, but a bit-wise XOR operation is performed
between each of these plaintext blocks and the plaintext of
the first block, which is unknown to intruders, and hence the
resultant blocks will be transmitted to the destination with
same security level as the first block. Perceptively speaking,
the first block will not be recovered without performing the
decryption process, which is assumed to be very immune
for cryptanalysis, and therefore the other blocks will not
be detected by the intruders since the plaintext of the first
block is required to undo the XOR operation. This latter
operation can be performed to reveal all the plaintexts only
after decrypting the first block, B1 , at the receiver.
By performing the proposed mechanism following the
steps provided in Algorithm 1, the whole resultant data stream
will then be secure since the data will not be recovered
by any intruder without breaking the first cipher B̃1 that is
encrypted using AES. Security and reliability of transmission
can be further enhanced if Algorithm 1 is executed every one
superframe (NF frames) or multiple of superframes using a
new encryption key.
2 The AES cipher algorithm is a known standard algorithm that is very
immune to adversary attack by intruders such as a brute force attacker. The
encryption key is assumed to be known only to the destination node where
the cipher message of the first block is received and decrypted to convey
the plaintext. The AES cipher requires a 128 block size and a 128/192/256
key size that satisfies the entropy condition for the key size. The general
design of the AES has pre-round transformation (initial stage), R−rounds,
key expansion, and a final stage. The number of rounds is determined by
the key size. Particularly, the AES uses 10, 12, and 14 rounds for key sizes
of 128, 192, and 256, respectively. The number of processing cycles for each
operation (AND, OR, Exclusive OR (XOR), and SHIFT) varies based on
the number of rounds included in the encryption algorithm as a result of
different keys adopted. Also, the number of overhead processing cycles (PC)
in the decryption is larger than the number of PC used in the encryption. The
general architecture of AES is shown in Fig. 3.
VOLUME 8, 2020

FIGURE 3. AES general architecture.

III. BER ANALYSIS OF LIGHTWEIGHT ENCRYPTION
MODEL PROPOSED IN [25]

We first describe the encryption ratio (βc ) introduced in [25],
as a figure of merit to be used in the performance analysis in
this paper, which is defined as the ratio of the overall length of
ciphertext using the XOR operation to the length of ciphertext
using conventional algorithms; i.e., βc = (NF Nβb l−1)βl =
(NF Nb − 1) where NF , Nb , and βl are as defined before. This
parameter reveals the amount of overhead reduction when
using this particular algorithm. As a result, as the value of
βc increases, the overhead decreases for a given superframe
of data and hence the throughput increases.
A. ERROR ANALYSIS WITHOUT DATA ENCODING

In this subsection, we analyze the overall superframe average
bit error rate (BER) performance for the encryption algorithm
under study assuming BPSK transmission over AWGN channel model without data error correction encoding. We also
compare this BER with the one for the conventional encryption algorithm (i.e., all of the superframe blocks are assumed
13433
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Input: Data stream as plaintext
Output: Data stream as ciphertext
Divide the data sequence into N superframes;
foreach Ni superframe SFi , i = 1, . . . , N , to be sent do
Divide each superframe into NF frames;
Divide the frame (Fk ), k = 1, . . . , NF , into Nb
blocks with block size of K = βl ;
Encrypt the first block B1 with an appropriate
encryption algorithm, i.e., B̃1 = Ek [B1 ] foreach of
the remaining blocks Bj , j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , Nb NF } do
b̃i,j = bi,j ⊕ bi,1 , i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , K − 1};
Generate the cipher blocks as
B̃j = [b̃0,j , . . . , b̃K −1,j ] ;
end
Generate the cipher frame as
S̃ = [B̃1 , B̃2 , · · · , B̃Nb NF ];
end
Generate the cipher superframe accordingly. Repeat for
other superframes;
Algorithm 1 Generating Lightweight Ciphertext Based on
Proposed Algorithm in [25]

channel noise and fades), which is given by

PeE = 0.5 1 − [1 − PeG ]βl .

(2)

In order to derive PeXOR , we first consider the kth block Bk
where k = 2, 3, . . . , Nb NF . The lth bit in Bk , say bl,k , results
from XORing the lth bit of B1 , i.e. bl,1 , with the lth bit of B̃k ,
b̃l,k for k = 2, 3, . . . , Nb NF . Consequently, bl,k is decrypted
correctly, with bit correct probability, say PcXOR , if and only
if both of bl,1 and b̃l,k , for k = 2, 3, . . . , Nb NF , are correct or
both are in error. By defining the following events: A = {both
of bl,1 and b̃l,k are correct}, B = {both of bl,1 and b̃l,k are in
error}, A1 = {bl,1 is correct}, A2 = {b̃l,k is correct}, A3 =
{bl,1 is in error} and A4 = {b̃l,k is in error}, we can write
PcXOR =
=
=
=

Pr{A ∪ B} = Pr{A} + Pr{B} − Pr{A ∩ B}
Pr{A1 ∩ A2 } + Pr{A3 ∩ A4 } − 0
Pr{A1 }Pr{A2 } + Pr{A3 }Pr{A4 }
(1 − PeE )(1 − PeG ) + PeE PeG .
(3)

And hence,
PeXOR = 1 − PcXOR = PeG + PeE − 2PeG PeE .

(4)

Now, the superframe average BER for the algorithm under
study can be given as
to be encrypted via a conventional encryption algorithm such
as AES). Our target is to find the superframe average BER at
the output of the receiver P/S convertor. This is possible by
tracking the bits propagation through the different stages in
the receiver. As shown in Fig. 1, at the output of the demodulator (before decryption), each detected bit of the received
superframe has BER caused by the noise in the channel,
say PeG , which is, for BPSK modulation [27, Eq. (5.2-5)],
given as
p 
PeG = Q
2γb
(1)

PeE + (Nb NF − 1)PeXOR
Nb NF
PeE + βc PeXOR
=
.
βc + 1

Peproposed =

(5)

It should be noted that if heavy conventional encryption
was used throughout the whole blocks, then the superframe
average BER in (5) reduces, as expected, to
Peconv =

PeE + (Nb NF − 1)PeE
= PeE .
Nb NF

(6)

B. ERROR ANALYSIS WITH DATA ENCODING

where γb = NEbo is the average signal-to-noise power
ratio (SNR) per bit with per-bit average energy of Eb and
white Gaussian noise with variance of N2o . After that, these
detected bits pass through the S/P convertor in order to
divide the detected superframe into its blocks B̃1 , B̃2 , · · ·,
B̃Nb NF . Among all of these blocks, only B̃1 ciphertext block
is decrypted using conventional decryption algorithm and
a decryption key to obtain the plaintext block B1 , whereas
each of the remaining blocks (B̃2 , B̃3 , · · ·, B̃Nb NF ) is bit-wise
XORed with the first decrypted block B1 to obtain the remaining plaintext blocks B2 , B3 , · · ·, BNb NF . Since the first block,
B1 , is encrypted differently (i.e., using conventional encryption) than the remaining blocks, it is expected to experience
different BER (with avalanche [1], [2], [4], [28]), say PeE ,
while the remaining blocks, B2 , B3 , · · ·, BNb NF , will experience equal BER, say PeXOR , which is quantitatively different
from PeE . The BER associated with the decrypted block B1 ,
PeE , which is the BER at the output of the decrypter (caused
by decryption avalanche effect) has been derived in [28] in
terms of the BER at the input of the decrypter (caused by
13434

In this subsection, in order to investigate the effect of data
error correction encoding on BER analysis, we assume that
the encoder/decoder pair shown in Fig. 1 is active and two
types of error correction coding techniques are considered,
namely, the Hamming encoder and the convolutional encoder.
Hamming code [29, Ch. 4] belongs to the linear block
codes (LBC) family and it is parameterized by an integer
` ≥ 2. For (n, k) Hamming code, n = 2` − 1 is the encoder
output codeword length, k = 2` − ` − 1 is the encoder
information sequence input length, and Rc = kn is the coding
rate. The error correction capability factor t for the Hamming
encoder is 1, and hence, it has a minimum distance dmin of 3
[29, Ch. 4]. Convolutional codes [29, Ch. 11] differ from LBC
codes in that the encoder contains memory. This means that
the encoder output at any given time unit depends on the input
at this time unit and on some number of previous inputs.
A convolutional code is defined by three parameters, K the
number of inputs, N the number of outputs and m the memory
order, and hence, it can be described either as: (N , K , m)
K
convolutional code
convolutional code or as a rate R = N
VOLUME 8, 2020
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with memory order m. Furthermore, the code rate of the conh
h K
volutional code is given as Rc = kn = h+m
R = h+m
N where
h is the length of information sequence at any input of the
h
code [29, pp. 485-486]. If h  m, then h+m
≈ 1, and hence,
Rc ≈ R. In addition, the convolutional decoding is performed
by applying the Viterbi algorithm on the received codeword
and two types of decoding can be performed, the soft decision
decoding (SDD) and the hard decision decoding (HDD).
Now, because of data encoding, the average energy per bit
at the output of the encoder is reduced by the coding rate Rc
and given as Ec = Rc Eb , where Eb is the average energy
per information bit at the input of the encoder. In this case,
the average BER at the demodulator output, instead of (1),
is given by
p 
2γc
(7)
=Q
Pencoding
eG
where γc = NEco is the average SNR per bit in case of data
encoding. The BER at the output of the decoder depends
on the decoder type, either Hamming or convolutional, and
on whether the decoder uses SDD or HDD. For Hamming
codes, considering HDD, the BER at the decoder output can
be approximated as [30]

n−1
.
(8)
P ≈ Pencoding
− Pencoding
1 − Pencoding
eG
eG
eG
For convolutional codes, the BER for HDD and SDD
can be bounded, respectively, as [27, Eq. (8.2-32)] and
[27, Eq. (8.2-26)]
" r
#
∞

 ddfree
X
encoding
encoding
P≤
Bd 2 PeG
1 − PeG
d=dfree

" r

encoding
PeG

≈ Bdfree 2



encoding
1 − PeG

#
 dfree

(9)

and
P≤

∞
X

Bd Q

p

p

2dγc ≈ Bdfree Q
2dfree γc
(10)

d=dfree

where Bd ’s are the coefficients of the bit weight enumerating
function (WEF) and dfree is the minimum Hamming distance
of the code. For the encryption algorithm, under study in
this paper, with data encoding, the BER at the output of the
P/S convertor for the first encrypted block B1 is given,
in analogy to (2), as

Pencoding
= 0.5 1 − [1 − P]βl
(11)
eE
and for the remaining blocks, B2 , B3 , · · ·, BNb NF , is given,
in analogy to (4), as
Pencoding
= P + Pencoding
− 2PPencoding
eXOR
eE
eE

(12)

where P is given by (8), (9) or (10). Now, we can write the
superframe average BER, in analogy to (5), as
encoding

Pencoding
eproposed
VOLUME 8, 2020

=

PeE

encoding

+ βc PeXOR
βc + 1

.

(13)

Similar to (6), in the case of using heavy conventional encryption all over the whole blocks with data encoding, the superframe average BER in (13) reduces, as expected, to
encoding

PeE

=
Pencoding
econv

encoding

+ (Nb NF − 1)PeE
Nb NF

.
= Pencoding
eE

(14)

Now, instead of encoding all of the superframe blocks,
we propose to encode only the first block, B1 , of each superframe, as it is the only block that will experience avalanche
effect. In this case, the BER for B1 at the output of the
decryption stage is given by (11), while the BER for the
remaining blocks, B2 , B3 , · · ·, BNb NF , before the XORing is
given by (1) and after the XORing is given by
encoding
+ PeG − 2PeG Pencoding
Pfirst
eE
eXOR = PeE

(15)

and the overall superframe average BER is given by
encoding

first

+ βc PeXOR
.
(16)
βc + 1
Similarly, for the case of using heavy conventional encryption
all over the whole blocks while only the first block is encoded,
the overall superframe average BER can be given as
Pfirst
eproposed =

PeE

encoding

+ (Nb NF − 1)PeE
Nb NF
encoding
+ βc PeE
PeE
.
=
βc + 1

Pfirst
econv =

PeE

(17)

encoding

are given by (2) and (11), respecwhere PeE and PeE
tively.
Table 1 is the BER formulas comparisons table, which
summarizes the ultimate equation numbers used to compute
the BER performance of the conventional and the proposed
encryption models for the three scenarios of no data encoding,
data encoding, and first block data encoding.
IV. THROUGHPUT ANALYSIS OF LIGHTWEIGHT
ENCRYPTION MODEL PROPOSED IN [25]

In this section, we provide throughput analysis for both the
lightweight encryption algorithm proposed in [25] and the
conventional encryption algorithms considering the two cases
of with and without data encoding. In general, the throughput T can be defined as the number of correctly received
information-carrying bits per second, which can be mathematically written in terms of the bit rate R as
T = R(1 − pe )βl

(18)

)βl

where (1 − pe
is the probability of correct reception of
βl -bits length block with average BER of pe . For a superframe
with NF Nb blocks, the average throughput can be obtained by
averaging the throughput amounts of all the blocks within the
superframe, i.e.
T =

NF Nb
1 X
Ri (1 − pei )βl .
NF Nb

(19)

i=1
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TABLE 1. BER formulas comparisons table.

TABLE 2. Throughput formulas comparisons table.

Because here we evaluate the superframe average throughput
for information-carrying bits, the effective transmission data
rate of the encrypted block is considered to be Rencry = ηR,
where η < 1 because of the overhead. In addition, the effective transmission data rate of the encoded block is considered
to be Rencoding = Rc R, where Rc < 1 is the coding rate.
By these considerations, we write the superframe average
throughput for the lightweight encryption algorithm in [25]
and for the conventional encryption algorithm considering the
cases of (i) without data encoding, (ii) encoding all the blocks
and (iv) encoding only the first block, respectively, as shown
in Table 2.
All of the BER and throughput expressions reported in
this paper are obtained considering AWGN channels. To generalize these expressions for the case when the channel
experiences fading in addition to noise, we average these
results over the probability density function (PDF) of the
instantaneous signal-to-noise ratio γ of the assumed fading
13436

model. For example, for a Rayleigh fading channel, we average the results over the PDF of the instantaneous SNR
γ of the Rayleigh distribution, which is exponential with
parameter γ¯b , as
Z ∞
1
γ
Pe =
Pe (γ ). exp( )dγ
(26)
γ¯b
γ¯b
0
and
Z

∞

T (γ ).

T =
0

1
γ
exp( )dγ
γ¯b
γ¯b

(27)

After analyzing the error and throughput performance
of the lightweight encryption model under study considering realistic scenarios, in the following section,
we propose a new modification on its mechanism to
further enhance its security level but without significantly affecting its heaviness as a lightweight encryption
model.
VOLUME 8, 2020

Y. M. Khattabi et al.: Revisiting Lightweight Encryption for IoT Applications

FIGURE 4. Transceiver Structure (Modified by adding KBMPB and R-KBMPB operations to enhance security of the proposed lightweight encryption
mechanism in [25]).

V. ENHANCED LIGHTWEIGHT ENCRYPTION MODEL
A. PROPOSED SECURITY ENHANCEMENT

In order to enhance the security level of the lightweight
encryption model under study, we propose adding a new security process box to be implemented after the bit-wise XORing
process in Fig. 1.a, which we name as Key-Based Multiplexed Permutation Box (KBMPB). This process is reversed
before the bit-wise XORing process in Fig. 1.b, which is
equivalent to a process we name as Reverse Key-Based
Multiplexed Permutation Box (R-KBMPB). Thus, the proposed new transceiver can be implemented as shown
in Fig. 4. Again, the difference between this figure and
Fig. 1 is the addition of the KBMPB and R-KBMPB blocks,
as shown. The transmission algorithm of this proposed
security-enhanced lightweight encryption model is detailed
in the text structure in Algorithm 2. Notice that Algorithm 2
is an extended version of Algorithm 1 with improved security. The added new step in Algorithm 2 is the KBMPB
operation.
The KBMPB box is applied at the output blocks B̃j , in pairwise, as shown in Fig. 4a above. KBMPB is a new technique
we propose to be used to enhance security without the need
for implementing the strict avalanche criterion. The KBMPB
operation has four inputs to it and one output. Two inputs are
VOLUME 8, 2020

the blocks B̃j and B̃j+1 as shown in Fig. 4a, and the other
two inputs are secret keys each associated with each of these
two input blocks B̃j and B̃j+1 . The function of the KBMPB
is to multiplex the two input ciphertext blocks B̃j and B̃j+1
into one double-sized block by scrambling using secret keys.
The output block of the KBMPB, S̃m with m =
{1, 2, · · · , Nb2NF }, shown in Fig. 4a, is considered to be the
final secure ciphertext that will be transmitted over the wireless communication channel, after coding and modulation.3
It is obvious that this proposed modification with the added
KBMPB process further enhances the security level of the
lightweight encryption algorithm under study. This can be
justified by the fact that even in the case that B1 is detected by
intruders, the other blocks B2 , B3 , ·, BNb NF will not be recovered as the secret keys of the KBMPB operation are supposed
to be unknown. In addition, this attained security enhance3 The idea of our proposed KBMPB process is inspired by the idea of
Round 17 process proposed in [6] to improve the DES algorithm. However,
in Round 17 in [6] an input block of size 64 bits is mapped into an output
block of size 128 bits (see [6, Fig. 2]), i.e, there is a waste of half size
in the output block which results in reducing data throughput by factor of
two. On the other hand, in our proposed KBMPB (see Fig. 5) two input
blocks each with size 128 bits are randomly multiplexed and mapped into
one double-sized 256 bits output block, i.e., the overall data throughput is
kept unchanged.
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FIGURE 5. The mechanism of the KBMPB.

ment does not break the feature that the algorithm is still
lightweight as the added overhead and processing time are
related to the KBMPB and R-KBMPB mechanisms, which
are light as compared to the heavy computational operations
and rounds performed in classical encryption algorithms like
the AES.
B. KBMPB MECHANISM

The mechanism of the KBMPB is described as follows. Each
of the two input blocks to it is divided into sub-frames of
4 bits each. The length of the output block of the KBMPB
is double-sized as compared to each of its ciphertext input
blocks. Therefore, each of the first input block sub-frames is
scrambled within distinct sub-frames in the output block with
an appropriate associated secret key for all the sub-frames
of the first block. The other input block sub-frames can be
scrambled within the remaining empty sub-frames in the
output block using a separate appropriate secret key for the
whole sub-frames of the block. It should be noted here that
the two scrambling secret keys should be selected in a way
such that the sub-frames assigned in the output block to the
first input block do not collide with the ones assigned to
the second input block. In the proposed mechanism, each
of the two inputs, to the KBMPB, is a 128-bit block size
(i.e., K = βl = 128). These two blocks are scrambled
and multiplexed into a 256-bit cipher block size output using
two distinct secret keys of 192-bit size each with a mapping
procedure explained in Fig. 5. In this procedure, each of the
128-bit inputs is divided into 32 sub-frames of four bits each,
which are mapped into an output cipher block of 64 subframes four bits each (256-bit block size). To achieve this
mapping (64 sub-frames), each of the two inputs needs a
secret key of size 192 bits (32 sub-keys of 6 bits each).
13438

For each (input, key) pair, each 6-bit sub-key of the 192-bit
key is used to map one of the 4-bit input sub-frames of
the 128-bit input block into one 4-bit output sub-frame of
the 256-bit cipher block output. So, for each pair, the input
sub-frames are scrambled randomly into 32 out of the 64 output sub-frames according to the associated key. The remaining 32 sub-frames of the output are randomly filled with the
sub-frames of the other input block according to the other
secret key. For the example shown in Fig. 5, suppose the first
6 bits of the key are 000101 (decimal 5). This means that the
first 4-bit sub-frame of the input will be mapped into the fifth
4-bit sub-frame of the output. The secret keys are assumed to
be known to the destination so it will be able to recover the
individual 128-bit ciphertext blocks out of the total 256-bit
received ciphertext using the R-KBMPB operation. To summarize, the proposed enhanced lightweight encryption has a
plaintext of 128-bit size, an overall ciphertext of 256-bit size,
and an overall key of 512-bit size (128 + 192+192).
C. PERFORMANCE OF ENHANCED-SECURITY
ALGORITHM

Literally, adding the KBMPB and R-MBMPB operations in
the enhanced-security lightweight encryption algorithm proposed above does not deteriorate the error rate and throughput
performance as compared to that of the original algorithm
before adding the KBMPB and R-MBMPB operations. This
is due to the fact that, at the receiving side shown in Fig. 4b,
re-scrambling the data bits back to their original positions
using the R-KBMPB operation definitely does not affect the
fact that they were detected correctly or erroneously. Therefore, all BER and throughput analytical expressions derived
in Sections III and IV are also valid for this enhanced-security
algorithm.
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Input: Data stream as plaintext
Output: Data stream as ciphertext
Divide the data sequence into N superframes;
foreach Ni superframe SFi , i = 1, . . . , N , to be sent do
Divide each superframe into NF frames;
Divide the frame (Fk ), k = 1, . . . , NF , into Nb
blocks with block size of K = βl ;
Encrypt the first block B1 with an appropriate
encryption algorithm, i.e., B̃1 = Ek [B1 ]
foreach of the remaining blocks Bj ,
j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , Nb NF } do
b̃i,j = bi,j ⊕ bi,1 , i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , K − 1};
Generate the cipher blocks as
B̃j = [b̃0,j , . . . , b̃K −1,j ] ;
end
foreach pair B̃2m−1 , B̃2m , m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Nb2NF } do
S̃m = KBMPB[B̃2m−1 , B̃2m ]; where KBMPB is
the key-based multiplexed permutation operation
end
Generate the cipher frame as
S̃ = [S̃1 , S̃2 , · · · , S̃ Nb NF ];
2

end
Generate the cipher superframe accordingly. Repeat for
other superframes;
Algorithm 2 The Enhanced Lightweight Encryption

FIGURE 6. Superframe average BER performance for the lightweight
encryption algorithm under study and that for the conventional AES and
the lightweight proposed in [26] with Hamming code over AWGN channel.
Nf = 100, Nb = 10, and βl = 128.

VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS

In this section, we provide numerical results to compare
between the performance of lightweight encryption algorithm
under study in one side and the conventional AES encryption
algorithm and the image lightweight encryption algorithm
proposed in [26] in the other side. This comparison is in
terms of the superframe average BER and the normalized
VOLUME 8, 2020

FIGURE 7. Superframe average BER performance for the lightweight
encryption algorithm under study and that for the conventional AES with
convolutional code over AWGN channel. Nf = 100, Nb = 10, and βl = 128.

throughput. The results for our particular lightweight and the
conventional encryption algorithms are obtained using the
derived BER and throughput analytical expressions summarized in Table1 and Table 2, respectively. On the other hand,
the results for the image lightweight encryption algorithm
proposed in [26] are obtained through MATLAB simulation.4 We consider AWGN channel that experiences Rayleigh
fading, and two types of data encoders (to encode the first
block of each superframe), LBC Hamming code and (3,
1, 2) convolutional code with transform domain generator
matrix G(D) = [1 + D, 1 + D2 , 1 + D + D2 ], Bdfree = 1 and
dfree = 7. We also assume the following parameters’ values:
NF = 100, Nb = 10, βl = 128, and η = 0.8.
In Fig. 6, we compare between the three considered
encryption models in terms of the superframe average BER
over the AWGN channel. First, we can observe from this figure that the lightweight image encryption algorithm proposed
in [26] (with image size as the AES block size of 128 bits)
offers same poor BER performance as that of the conventional AES for both cases with or without data channelencoding. Because of that, in the following figures we restrict
the comparison to be between the AES and our lightweight
encryption algorithm. However, we can also observe from
Fig. 6 that the our lightweight algorithm does not improve
the BER performance when the data is not encoded by any
error correction code. By having the first block not encoded,
it results in avalanche in this block, after decryption. This
error that occurs after decrypting the first block (avalanche)
4 We have directly used the open source MATLAB code written by the
authors of [26] to simulate the encryption/decryption processes of their
proposed image lightweight encryption algorithm. Specifically, we have
extended this MATLAB simulation code to be used to evaluate the error
rate and throughput performance of the image encryption algorithm proposed
in [26]. This extension has been done by adding the stages of the encoder,
the modulator, the channel, the demodulator, the decoder, and the error rate
counter.
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FIGURE 8. Superframe average BER performance for the lightweight
encryption algorithm under study and that for the conventional AES with
Hamming code over Rayleigh fading channel. NF = 100, Nb = 10, and
βl = 128.

FIGURE 10. Superframe average throughput performance for the
lightweight encryption algorithm under study and that for the
conventional AES with Hamming code AWGN channel. NF = 100, Nb = 10,
βl = 128, and η = 0.8.

FIGURE 9. Superframe average BER performance for the lightweight
encryption algorithm under study and that for the conventional AES with
convolutional code over Rayleigh fading channel. NF = 100, Nb = 10, and
βl = 128.

FIGURE 11. Superframe average throughput performance for the
lightweight encryption algorithm under study and that for the
conventional AES with convolutional code over AWGN channel. NF = 100,
Nb = 10, βl = 128, and η = 0.8.

will propagate throughout the whole remaining blocks via the
XORing operation at the receiver as shown in Fig. 1. On the
other hand, by encoding the first block of both algorithms via
the Hamming code, the BER performance of our particular
algorithm is improved while it does not improve for the
conventional algorithm. This is because that encoding the
first block in the proposed algorithm improves the BER of
that block and this improvement is reflected to the remaining
blocks through the XORing at the receiver, keeping in mind
that all these remaining blocks don’t experience avalanche
after decryption at the receiver. Whereas, in the conventional encryption case, all transmitted blocks will experience
avalanche effect after decryption, at the receiver, and hence

encoding only the first block improves its own BER while the
remaining blocks will still experience avalanche effect. From
Fig. 7 we can also notice that applying the convolutional code
on the above scenario gives same observations. Furthermore,
improvements achieved by our algorithm are also noticeable
for the case of fading channels as well, see Fig. 8 and Fig. 9.
From these two figures, we can also notice that, in case of
fading channels, the improvement occurred by our algorithm
is much better in the case of applying the convolutional
code as compared to Hamming code. The reason for that
is related to the code design where the convolutional code
is more suitable than the Hamming code in fading channel
environments.
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VII. CONCLUSION

FIGURE 12. Superframe average throughput performance for the
lightweight encryption algorithm under study and that for the
conventional AES with Hamming code over Rayleigh fading channel.
NF = 100, Nb = 10, βl = 128, and η = 0.8.

FIGURE 13. Superframe average throughput performance for the
lightweight encryption algorithm under study and that for the
conventional AES with convolutional code over Rayleigh fading channel.
NF = 100, Nb = 10, βl = 128, and η = 0.8.

Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 compare between the superframe
normalized throughput for our particular algorithm and the
conventional one over the AWGN channel with Hamming
and convolutional codes, respectively. It is obvious from
these two figures that our lightweight algorithm provides
higher throughput over the conventional algorithm regardless
whether the data is encoded or not. Moreover, in case of
data encoding, there is no noticeable improvement appears
on the conventional algorithm throughput while improvement
is obvious for the case of our algorithm. These observations
are also valid for the case of fading channels, see Fig. 12 and
Fig. 13.
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In this paper, we have revisited a lightweight encryption
algorithm reported in literature and studied its performance
in wireless channels in terms of bit error rate and data transmission throughput. In the lightweight encryption algorithm
under study, using standard conventional heavy encryption
such as AES is required only for one block among several blocks in a superframe, and hence large amounts of
overhead and processing time delay reductions are achieved,
which makes the algorithm most suitable for resource-limited
devices used in IoT applications. The size of this block,
which we referred to as the first block, is determined by the
conventional encryption algorithm used for this first block.
In this algorithm, all the remaining blocks of the information
are then transmitted securely over the channel without a need
for using heavy encryption. BER and throughput are vital performance metrics when it comes to interfacing Big Data with
resource-limited devices especially in a wireless environment with severe fading and limited bandwidth. Therefore,
we evaluated the performance of this proposed algorithm in
terms of BER and throughput considering the AWGN channel that also experiences Rayleigh fading. To investigate the
effects of the error correction codes on this performance evaluation, we have considered two types of data encoding; the
Hamming code and the convolutional code, where we have
only assumed encoding the first encrypted block, which also
results in reduced overhead and computational complexity in
addition to achieving higher data throughput as compared to
conventional encryption schemes that assume applying heavy
encryption (e.g., AES) to all the blocks in the superframe.
Furthermore, in this work, we have enhanced the security
level of the lightweight encryption algorithm under study
without significantly increasing its overhead size or computational complexity and also without affecting its error
rate and throughput performance. Through numerical results,
we have shown that the BER performance of the lightweight
encryption algorithm under study is superior to that of the
conventional encryption algorithms in the case when data
encoding is implemented. In addition, the lightweight encryption algorithm under study has proven its throughput superiority over the conventional algorithm regardless whether
the data is encoded or not as demonstrated by the numerical
results reported in this paper. The mathematical framework
presented in this paper is of its first kind in the field as
applied to lightweight encryption and opens doors for evaluation other lightweight encryption algorithms proposed in
literature for IoT and other emerging technology applications.
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